The deconstructed grocery list by Farber, Daniel A.
THE DECONSTRUCTED GROCERY LIST 
There are said to be certain Buddhists whose ascetic practices enable them to see a 
whole landscape in a bean. Precisely what the first analysts of narrative were at-
tempting: to see all the world's stories (and there have been ever so many) within a 
single structure . . . . 
Roland Barthes 1 
Departing Solicitor General Rex E. Lee was especially poignant in a valedictory 
interview with the New York Times: "I never thought when I was in law school 
that ... I'd have to think twice in the supermarket about buying Giant brand or 
Thomas' English muffins." 
We none of us can choose our moments of epiphany, and it is unfair to mock the 
Solicitor General for experiencing his in a supermarket. 
Michael K.insley2 
Late night at the grocery store. K. enters confidently. The 
store is almost empty. Just a few things to pick up on the way home 
from work. Now, where is that list? Here? No. A moment of 
unease. Oh, there. Good. Just a short list, only ten items. Now to 
begin. (And then home at last.) 
First, "apples." K. yawns. No problem, there they are, watch 
out for the bad spots. Still, a very nice crop this year, let's take six 
or maybe seven. Wait a second, though, what kind of apples? Mac-
Intosh, in honor of the computer revolution. Granny Smith for the 
crisp sour taste. Golden Delicious-"res ipsa loquitur or maybe 
nomine ipsa loquitur," thinks K., a somewhat addled law professor 
who has just finished a very long day at the office. But what kind of 
apple to get? K's favorite? Or that preferred by the list's author? 
Or the kind some prospective guest may prefer? The possibilities 
are mind boggling, at least for K., whose mind was pretty well bog-
gled to begin with. 
It is undoubtedly a foolish point, a trivial question. A trivial 
question should be easy to answer. Why get hung up on it? Still, 
what is the correct answer? Like many trivial points-this is the 
experience of the law professor speaking- this one gets harder and 
harder the more it is considered. Think of the ink spilled over the 
eleventh amendment or article I courts. Not to mention the old 
common-law chestnuts. Can a woman recover damages because 
fireworks knocked down the scales, which then fell on her? (K. no-
I. R. BARTHES, S/Z 3 (R. Miller trans. 1974). 
2. M. KINSLEY, CURSE OF THE GIANT MUFFINS AND OTHER WASHINGTON MALA· 
DIES 174 (1987). 
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tices suddenly the closeness of the produce scales and moves ner-
vously away; it seems like bad luck.) So ... what kind of apples? 
Many questions are better left unasked. Once asked, however, 
they must be answered. Surely a mind that can master Pennoyer v. 
Neff and Erie R.R. v. Tomkins can definitively resolve the mere se-
lection of a fruit. 
It is not easy, however, to see where to begin the analysis. For-
tunately, K.'s briefcase is at hand. (K. couldn't bear to leave it in 
the car; it contains the disk of K.'s tenure piece.) Some research is 
in order. 
Start with something easy to understand. How about an 
originalist? K. takes out a book and begins to read. (Just as well 
that the hour is late and the store is empty, otherwise even a law 
professor might feel embarrassed.) "When we speak of 'law,' we 
ordinarily refer to a rule that we have no right to change except 
through prescribed procedures. That statement assumes that the 
rule has a meaning independent of our own desires." Sounds very 
shrewd and very applicable. A grocery list certainly has a meaning 
independent of our own desires. And K. doesn't have the authority 
to rewrite the list. (Well, that's an exaggeration, but why risk a tiff? 
Better to follow the list.) 
Which book is this, anyway? Ah, The Tempting of America: 
The Political Seduction of the Law. Page 143. A shrewd man, that 
Robert Bork. K. firmly resolves neither to be tempted nor politi-
cally seduced. The list must be followed at all costs. If we cannot 
be faithful to principle in small things, what hope is there for the 
large ones? 
Now, to proceed. Bork must explain how principled interpre-
tation is to be done. Tum the page. "What is the meaning of a rule 
that judges should not change? It is the meaning understood at the 
time of the law's enactment . . . . The search is not for subjective 
intent . . . . All that counts is how the words used in the Constitu-
tion would have been understood at the time." 
K. feels crushed. This is no help at all. The list was written 
early this morning. Why is the "meaning understood" in the morn-
ing more important than the meaning understood this evening? 
Anyway, if K. knew the "understood meaning" (understood by 
whom?), there wouldn't be any problem. K. wouldn't have under-
stood the list any better this morning than now-the problem isn't 
whether to use K.'s original or K.'s cu"ent understanding. The 
Bork book slips from K.'s fingers onto the floor. 
If Bork doesn't help, his opponents might. Remember Dwor-
kin's distinction between concepts and conceptions. Didn't Dwor-
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kin say that the Court shouldn't be influenced by the framers' 
conceptions of constitutional rights? Instead, the Court should con-
sider their concept of those rights. K. remembers the quote vividly: 
It would be a mistake for the Court to be much inftuenced by the fact that when the 
clause was adopted capital punishment was standard and unquestioned. That 
would be decisive if the framers of the clause had meant to lay down a particular 
conception of cruelty, because it would show that the conception did not extend so 
far. But it is not decisive of the different question the Court now faces, which is 
this: Can the Court, responding to the framers' appeal to the concept of cruelty, 
now defend a conception that does not make death crue1?3 
How would a similar analysis work here? Whatever conception of 
applehood that the author might have had, K. would have to ana-
lyze the concept of applehood. 
K's mind goes blank. Maybe Dworkin can make that distinc-
tion work, but K. just doesn't feel smart enough, not at this time of 
night, not after a long day of bluebooking footnotes. Ely isn't going 
to help much either. God only knows what a "representation rein-
forcing" interpretation of the word "apple" might be. Try another 
nonoriginalist. 
K. rummages again through the briefcase. Here's a non-
originalist in good standing. Michael Perry, on "Why Constitu-
tional Theory Matters to Constitutional Practice (and Vice Versa)." 
In the Summer, 1989, issue of Constitutional Commentary. 
K. feels a twinge of guilt, and properly so. This is the library 
copy of Constitutional Commentary. K. really shouldn't take it 
home. Besides, K. reads every issue, and knows of the journal's 
economic struggle. Yet K. has never subscribed. For shame. 
Don't think about that. What does the article say? Something 
about the original versus the aspirational meaning of a text. That 
sounds good. What is the aspirational meaning of the grocery list? 
Healthy tasty food, inexpensively priced. All the apples cost the 
same. Pick the kind that tastes best. To K. or the author of the 
list? This is getting silly. How about some Alternate Dispute Reso-
lution here? Three apples for K. and three of the Author's favor-
ites. Hurray for ADR! 
By now, K. is starting to feel that both the list and its author 
have begun to achieve some awful transcendental presence; K. is no 
longer dealing with a grocery list and the person who wrote it, but 
rather with a List and its Author. Now the List has been obeyed; 
the Author should be happy. 
3. R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 135-36 (1977). More recently, Dwor-
kin has switched to a "chain novel" metaphor. R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 224-40 (1986). 
It would be cruel, however, to extend K.'s travails to novel length. 
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With a sigh of relief, K. crosses apples off the shopping list and 
moves down the aisle. Alas, poor Bork is still lying forlornly on the 
floor, and even worse, the library copy of Con. Comm. is sitting in 
the fruit bin. K. hasn't slept well for several nights, working on the 
tenure piece, and the tension is beginning to take its toll. The whole 
thing has become quite a trial. Still, the masterpiece on "A Post-
Hermeneutic Approach to the Dormant Commerce Clause" is com-
ing along pretty well. But after spending so much time working on 
theories of interpretation, K. can't seem to put them out of mind. 
The next items are easy. "Bnch. grn. onions," "sml. bag car-
rots," "5 lb. wh. potato." With a renewed sense of self-confidence, 
K. puts these items into the cart. For a moment, K. was beginning 
to worry that this whole episode was a sign of excess stress or a 
burgeoning anxiety neurosis or something. Must just have been a 
wave of fatigue. 
K. jauntily wheels the cart around the comer and starts down 
the next aisle. This should be easy enough. Next on the list is tuna. 
Or, to be specific "1 can Sunburst Tuna." 
Damn. The Sunburst is sold out. Now what? 
The aspirational approach sounded good in the previous aisle, 
but now K. is beginning to have doubts, like a first year student 
whose confident first answer is met by the professor's steely-eyed 
stare. What is the aspirational meaning of tuna? Tunas don't have 
aspirations, except on T.V. commercials where they seek to attain 
good taste. And buying tuna is obviously too mundane an activity 
to dignify with an aspirational meaning. Besides, now that K. 
thinks about it again, the idea of using "cheap, healthy, tasty food" 
as a culinary aspiration seems awfully open-ended. K. wouldn't 
know whether to buy another brand of tuna, or sardines, or even 
tofu. Maybe Bork was right about that temptation business. This 
interpretation thing is getting trickier all the time. 
K. isn't really surprised by these difficulties. K. knows that 
interpretation is a treacherous process from reading the 
deconstructionists: 
The claim that all readings are misreadings can also be justified by the most 
familiar aspects of critical and interpretative practice. Given the complexities of 
texts, the reversibility of tropes, the extendibility of context, and the necessity for a 
reading to select and organize, every reading can be shown to be partial . . . . The 
history of readings is a history of misreadings, though under certain circumstances 
these misreadings can be and may have been accepted as readings.4 
4. J. CULLER, ON DECONSTRUCTION 176 (1982), quoted in Balkin, Deconstructive 
Practice and Legal Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 743, 774-75 (1987). As you see, after being im-
mersed in bluebooking for many hours, even K.'s stream of consciousness comes equipped 
with footnotes. 
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"All of my readings seem to be misreadings, at least," K. thinks. 
This knowledge seems depressing but not very helpful in figuring 
out what K. should buy instead of Sunburst Tuna. 
K. begins to feel that there is more to be said about the 
originalism issue. Here's a xerox that might be relevant, Tushnet's 
note on textualism in volume 58 of Southern Cal. K. thumbs 
through the pages and comes to page 825: "Critics of unsophistica-
ted textualism claim that radical indeterminacy of meaning is, 
within a liberal community, inevitable. It is no answer to that criti-
cism to say that indeterminacy gives boundless discretion to judges. 
I agree that it does .... " Should K. become an adherent of Critical 
Grocery Shopping? 
Boundless discretion. That sounds great. K. can buy another 
brand of tuna, or tofu, or-here an expression of longing passes 
over K.-perhaps even those wonderful chocolates. Then reality 
comes crashing in. All of the post-structural analysis in the world 
isn't going to convince the Author that chocolates are a reasonable 
substitute for tuna. 
Anyway, wasn't there another article where Tushnet said 
something rather different about interpretation? It's getting easier 
to find things in the briefcase, somehow it doesn't seem as cluttered. 
Here it is: 
Consider an ordinary conversation between two people. Alice hears Arthur 
use the word "arbogast." She thinks she knows what he means, but as the conver-
sation continues Alice realizes that Arthur is using the word in a way that comes to 
seem a little strange . . . . Because Arthur's life is by definition di1rerent from Al-
ice's, Alice finds herself left with only an illusory understanding of what Arthur 
says. Her task is then to identify the point at which she can, so to speak, think her 
way into Arthur's life, so that she can understand what he means through under-
standing how he has developed. S 
But that's no help either. Working all the way through the Au-
thor's life would take hours. Besides that, what childhood or even 
recent experiences are going to help now? And if K. can't under-
stand even a simple shopping list from the Author, what hope is 
there of understanding the Author's whole life? 
K. is beginning to feel short of breath. This whole situation is 
not only frustrating but ridiculous. Yet to feel overwhelmed about 
such a ridiculously small point is almost frightening. What's to be 
done? K. begins furiously pacing the floor next to the canned tuna, 
just opposite the rice and pasta display. 
Don't panic, K. thinks. After all, the whole problem is that the 
5. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral 
Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781, 825 (1983). 
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Sunburst Tuna isn't on the shelf. That can't be such a big problem. 
Don't forget Derrida's teaching: "Derrida sees his major project as 
exposing the bias in Western philosophy he calls the 'metaphysics of 
presence.' Each ... opposition privileges a kind of 'presence' over a 
corresponding kind of 'absence.' "6 This insight isn't much con-
crete help, but it is pleasant to think that only a philosophical bias 
privileges the "presence" of Sunburst Tuna over the "absence" of 
Sunburst Tuna. 
This comforting refiection gives K. time to calm down. After 
some deep breathing exercises, K. begins again to analyze the 
problem. 
Now that K. is thinking more calmly, Tushnet's approach 
seems somehow familiar. In fact, isn't it a lot like ... like Richard 
Posner's theory of statutory interpretation! Posner and Tushnet, 
what an odd pair. But Posner also says something about what to do 
when "imaginative reconstruction" breaks down.' Where's that 
xerox? No, it's at the office, but K. does have some notes. Here we 
go: when the judge's search for intent turns up nothing, the judge 
must solve the problem in a reasonable way. 
A reasonable solution. That shouldn't be hard to find. Sun-
burst Tuna is sold out. One reasonable solution might be to buy 
another brand, but none of them are on sale. Let's get something 
else on sale. Nothing here, but across the aisle there's a nice buy on 
pasta. 
K. buys some pasta, and hurries down the aisle, leaving behind 
an untidy pile of xeroxes in front of the canned fish and meats. 
K. is hotly pursued by nagging doubts. Can an instruction to 
buy Sunburst tuna really be construed as an instruction to buy 
pasta? Even if Sunburst Tuna is sold out? K. has the uneasy feeling 
that there will be some unkind words about this decision later in the 
evening. But it's important never to tum back. 
Luckily, there isn't much left on the list. Whoops, K. is going 
to have to tum back, having missed the reference to "3 tomatoes" 
while cruising the produce aisle. This doesn't seem to be a very 
good omen. If the tomatoes are all sold out, K.'s nerves may now 
be too shakey to resort to the Posner reasonableness approach, 
which after all requires a certain degree of confidence (something 
Posner seems to have a greater supply of than poor K. ). K. fer-
vently hopes that there are still some tomatoes on the shelf. 
Luckily, the tomatoes are still there. Also, this being winter, 
6. Balkin, supra note 4, at 747. 
7. R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL CoURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 286-89 (1985). 
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there is only one kind of tomato on the shelf-none of those tricky 
choices among varieties. This should be simple enough. Still, K. is 
no longer sure that anything is very simple. Even grocery shopping 
has become problematic in the post-modem age. Perhaps it would 
be wise to consult some authorities on interpretation before jumping 
to any conclusions. Probably, the Author meant forK. to buy to-
matoes, but that's not decisive. After all, deconstruction has dis-
posed of the fallacy of authorial intent: 
The structural precondition of the sign is its ability to break free from the 
author, and to mean other than what the author meant. The very act of "meaning" 
something creates a chasm between the sign and producer's intention . . . . The 
result is that the text, as it is repeatedly understood, takes on a life of its own in a 
relation of differance with the person who "meant" it .... s 
This leaves only the question of what the word "tomato" does 
mean, if not what the Author intended.9 
By now, K. has nearly exhausted the briefcase's supply of legal 
writers, and is left mostly with works of literary criticism. Here's a 
standard introductory text. Perhaps it will calm K. 's nerves. 
is 
But the literary theorists seem to offer no solace. One of them 
quite happy to accept that, when you get down to it, there is no 'objective' work of 
literature there on the seminar table at all. Ble<Jk House is just all the assorted 
accounts of the novel that have been or will be given. The true writer is the reader: 
. . . the readers have now overthrown the bosses and installed themselves in 
power.IO 
Now that K. has been installed in power, what to do next? Get the 
tomatoes or not, it's hard to say. Besides, K. came here to buy 
groceries, not to start an insurrection. Does the list call for toma-
toes, or doesn't it? How much existential freedom can a grocery 
shopper handle? 
Perhaps a structuralist approach would be better. There does 
seem to be a certain method to it, after all: 
What a structuralist critic would do would be to schematize the story [about a boy 
and his father] in diagrammatic form. The first unit of signification, 'boy quarrels 
with father,' might be rewritten as 'low rebels against high.' The boy's walk 
through the forest is a movement along a horizontal axis, in contrast to the vertical 
8. Balkin, supra note 4, at 780. 
9. K. was not the first to confront the tomato issue. See Nix v. Hedden, 149 U.S. 304, 
306 (1893) ("The single question in this case is whether tomatoes, considered as provisions, 
are to be classed as 'vegetables' or 'fruit' .... "). See also Frigaliment Importing Co. v. B.N.S. 
lnt'l Sales Corp., 190 F. Supp. Jl6 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (Friendly, J.) ("The issue is, what is 
chicken?"). See generally Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (the 
"sick chicken" case). 
10. T. EAGLETON, LITERARY THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 85 (1983). 
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axis low/high,' and could be indexed as 'middle.' .... Flushed with triumph, the 
structuralist rearranges his rules and reaches for the next story. 
What is notable about this kind of analysis is that, like Formalism, it brackets 
off the actual content of the story and concentrates entirely on the form . . . . As 
long as the structure of relations between the units is preserved, it does not matter 
what items you select. II 
Excellent. The list began with apples, which are high, then toma-
toes, and then it goes on to onions which are low. So tomatoes must 
be middle. And they do grow on vines. This is terrific. Everything 
fits. 
But K. wonders if a structuralist approach to shopping will 
really work. If the structuralist is right, only the relationship be-
tween the items counts. So instead of getting apples, tomatoes, and 
onions, K. could have gotten entirely different items: first, coconuts 
(high), then cucumbers (middle), and then cantaloupe (low). Or 
chicken (representing flight, a "high" method of getting around), 
lamb (representing locomotion, a "middle" form of transportation), 
and then cod (representing swimming, a "low" form of transporta-
tion). In short, if the structuralists are right, tomatoes, cucumbers, 
and cod are all interchangeable. That may be philosophically true, 
but it probably won't play well back home. 
K. is starting to hyperventillate. Desperately, K. pulls out an-
other book, this one by Roland Barthes, opens at random and be-
gins to read: 
To read is to find meanings, and to find meanings is to name them; but these named 
meanings are swept toward other names, names call to each other, reassemble, and 
their grouping calls for further naming: I name, I unname, I rename, so the text 
passes: it is a nomination in the course of becoming, a tireless approximation, a 
metonymic labor.l2 
How very unsettling this is. The grocery list itself blurs and shakes 
in K.'s hand, as the shelves of produce hang suspended in this un-
stable swirl of signifiers and signified. 
The briefcase is almost empty now. K. turns to the last xerox 
and then gasps. There, in the pages ofthe Harvard Law Review, is a 
specific discussion of K.'s dilemma by a leading feminist legal theo-
rist. It seems almost to have been written with this exact scene in 
mind, with almost supernatural prescience: 
Our diet is improved if the authority we trust has superior competence, our time is 
freed to be spent on other concerns, and our faith in the good intentions and compe-
tence of other members of our community is strengthened by their successful regu-
lation of this aspect of our lives. Yet one can also envision an over-regulated, 
authoritarian nightmare in which our health, as well as other aspects of our private 
11. /d. at 95. 
12. R. BARTHES, supra note 1, at 11. 
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lives, is strictly controlled by others . . . . Whether the world. including our own 
world, is better or worse because of our decisions to buy tomatoes because we have 
been told to purchase them, and whether our autonomy is strengthened or depleted, 
depends upon the nature and moral quality of this authoritarian relationship.13 
At last, someone who understands the deep issues involved in this 
simple shopping expedition. Surely, here must be the answer to the 
dilemma. 
The Harvard article, it would seem, is here by divine provi-
dence, with K.'s situation in mind. This has to be meaningful; it 
can't possibly be coincidence. Thank. God K. brought the article 
along in the briefcase! K. begins to read avidly. 
Thumbing through the pages, K.'s eye suddenly settles on the 
following line, which leaps out of the page: 
But the hands of one of the partners were already at K. ~ throat. 14 
The next line begins: "while the other thrust the knife deep .... " 
This is too much to bear: an article that discusses tomatoes, 
and then describes an act of violence against K. Who would have 
thought that a simple question about theories of interpretation 
could have such terrifying implications? 
The article drops out of K.'s suddenly numbed fingers into the 
tomato bin. Leaving books, xeroxes, briefcase and grocery list be-
hind, K. flees from the store, into the cold but undeconstructed 
night. 
D.A.F. 
13. West, Authority, Autonomy, and Choice: The Role of Consent in the Moral and 
Political Visions of Franz Kafka and Richard Posner, 99 HARV. L. REv. 384, 401-02 (1985). 
14. ld. at 421, quoting F. KAFKA, THE TRIAL 254-55 (1956). 
